Abstrucf-We formulate and solve a dynamic stochastic optimization problem of a nonstandard type, whose optimal solution features active learning. The proof of optimality and the derivation of the corresponding control policies is an indirect one, which relates the original single-person optimization problem to a sequence of nested zero-sum stochastic games. Existence of saddle points for these games implies the existence of optimal policies for the original stochastic control problem, which, in turn, can be obtained from the solution of a nonlinear deterministic optimal control problem. The paper also studies the problem of existence of stationary optimal policies when the time horizon is infinite and the objective function is discounted.
I. INTRODUCTION
NE of the major challenges of optimum stochastic control 0 theory has been to deal effectively with problems which do not satisfy the condition of the separation theorem [8] , known more casually as the separation principle, which refers to situations where the control and estimation (filtering) functions can be separated out and dealt with individually, either independently or sequentially. The simplest form in which the principle manifests itself is the so-called certainty-equivalence property which is responsible for the complete separation of the control and filtering functions in the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) optimal control problem. Here, the control does not affect the quality of information to be carried along the line, and the LQG problem therefore constitutes a prime example of a control system that is of the neutral type; moreover, the control design could be carried out independently of the noise corrupted measurements available at the stations.
If a stochastic control problem is not of the neutral type, there is the possibility that the control input will affect the information content of the measurements to be made at future stages, in which case, the estimation part cannot be decoupled from the control actions. In addition to the control actions impacting the filtering, the estimators developed will in turn impact the control actions and thereby their performance, thus bringing in an intricate interplay between the two. The presence of such multiple roles of control design (to improve control performance and simultaneously the quality of estimation-which are at times conflicting objectives) makes stochastic control problems with active learning quite intractable, both analytically and numerically, unless one resorts to some approximation schemes and is content with suboptimal laws [l] , [6] . There is no general theory available for such problems, and one cannot even identify a subclass whose complete solution can be obtained.
The main objective of this paper is to define a class of discretetime stochastic control problems of the nonneutral type, and to solve it for both finite and infinite horizons, by developing an indirect method for the derivation of optimal policies and for the proof of existence and optimality. The problem involves active learning, and is motivated by a macro-economics model of credibility and monetary policy developed recently (but not solved) in [5] . This is a model of monetary policy and inflation that incorporates asymmetric information between the private sector and the monetary authority. The former is a passive player who simply forms conditional (rational) expectations of the current inflation rate, which constitutes the surprise component of the policy maker's (the monetary authority) objective function. The policy maker tries to maximize the objective function by choosing a control policy which also affects the information carried to the passive player whose rational expectations in turn influence the performance of that policy (see also, [3] for a full discussion on and the economics aspects of this model).
The problem is formulated in precise mathematical terms in the next section as a nonstandard stochastic control problem. The complete solution to the two-stage version is provided in Section 111, which clearly displays the active learning role played by the optimal control. An interesting aspect of the derivation and proof of optimality is that, even though the original problem is a single person stochastic optimization problem, one has to introduce a seemingly related stochastic zero-sum game and study its saddlepoint solution. In Section IV we study the solution to the general finite-horizon problem with affine policies, and in Section V we discuss the more general case as well as the infinite-horizon case. The concluding remarks of Section VI end the paper. We should note at the outset that even though the original problem was motivated by a model arising in macro-economics, no background in economics is needed in order to follow the analysis and the methodology developed in this paper. We also feel that the solution technique introduced here for the first time should be of independent interest to researchers in stochastic control.
II. THE GENERAL MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The rational expectations model alluded to in Section I (see the Appendix for an economic interpretation) leads to the (nonstandard) stochastic control problem where the objective is to maximize over yN: = (yo, e , y N ) the functional subject to OO18-9286/88/12OO-1122$01 .OO 0 1988 IEEE where / 3 E (0, 1) is a discount factor, yi is a general Bore1 measurable mapping, c; is a scalar, and x0, U;, wi are independent Gaussian random variables, for i = 0, 1, . We note that the control U; enters the problem not through the state equation (2.2), but through the message process (2.6) and the cost function (2.1) to be minimized. The presence of the conditional expectation term in (2.1) makes this a nonstandard stochastic dynamic optimization problem not treated heretofore; furthermore, the problem is nonneutral since the choice of ui has a direct effect on the content of the information carried by the measurement y; regarding the state xi.
Our first observation here is that since
the objective function (2.1) can equivalently be written as which is a more convenient form to work with.
Our second observation is a reiteration of the earlier remark that even though the stochastic control problem formulated above is one with perfect information, it is not of the standard type because of the presence of the conditional expectation term E [xjlZj] in the cost functional, which depends on the past control values U,-Because of the nonstandard nature of the problem, it will be illuminating first to study the two-stage version, which clearly displays the dual role control plays in these stochastic optimization problems. The complete solution to this problem, presented in the next section, and the method of derivation and verification of optimality should be of independent interest. * -. , uo.
THE TWO-STAGE VERSION: A COMPLETE SOLUTION
In view of (2.8), the problem here is to maximize 1 1 + u o ( x 0 -2 0 ) -~ ( u~)~ (3.la) over yl = (yo, yl), where
Since J I is quadratic and strictly concave in y l , it has a unique maximum over y1 for each yo, given by yT(x1, Yo) = x1-a x 1 I Yo1 
The polynomial equation (3.7) will admit one or three or five real solutions, but every such solution will lie in the open interval (0, 1). Let Lo b_e that real solution of (3.7) that provides the largest value for F ( L ) defined by (3.6). If there is more than one maximizing solution, then Lo could be taken to be_ any one of them, which we will henceforth refer to as an F-maximizing solution of (3.7). We are now in a position to state our first result. optimal solution solution, which is
where Lo is an lhaximizing solution of (3.7), 0 < Lo < 1 , and
LOP0
2qo =f0 + 7 LoPo + 1 Yo.
0
The question now is whether it would be possible to improve upon the performance attained under cy,*, yT) above by going outside the class of affine policies for 7:. The following theorem provides a set of (sufficient) conditions under which this is not possible, and thus the pair (3.8) is overall optimal.
Theorem 3. I: The policy pair cy,*, y : ) given in Proposition 3.1 izthe uniqueglobally optimal solution of (3.1) if there exists an F-maximizing solution Lo of (3.7), satisfying the strict inequality LOU -Lo)Po< 1.
(3.9)
Proof: Before proceeding with the proof, it is important to note that implicit in the statement of the theorem is the property that there can be at most one F-maximizing solution of (3.7) that satisfies (3.9), which is a result we are also going to prove. Now, the proof of the theorem is an indirect one, relating the maximizing solution of I & which is to be minimized by a suitable choice of 6 = 6(yo) and maximized by an appropriate uo = y(xo), where yo = uo + w, is as defined before. We now claim that this game admits the unique saddle-point solution under the condition (3.9), where Lo is the unique Ihnaximizing solution of (3.7). To prove this claim, it will be sufficient to verify the validity of the two saddle-point inequalities G(6*, y * )~G ( 6 , y*), G(6*, y*)rG(S*, y), for all 6 for all y and show that the optimum solution is unique in each case. Initially, y e do not know whether Lo is unique, therefore, we take it as any F-maximizing solution of (3.7) that satisfies (3.9). Then, the first inequality above follows since G(6, y) is minimized over S for any y uniquely by the conditional mean of xo, and when y = y*, this conditional mean is affine in yo as given. For the second inequality, note that G(S*, y) is a quadratic function of uo =
~( x o ) ,
with the coefficient of ( uo)2 being The condition a < 0 directly implies that G(6*, y) is a strictly concave function of y, and being quadratic, it admits a unique Using the fact that Lo satisfies (3.7), the gain term above can be simplified to give
thus verifying the validity of the second saddle-point inequality, under the condition a < 0. Again using the fact that Lo satisfies (3.7), CY can be simplified to
and, hence the concavity condition is indeed equivalent to (3.9). Note that under this condition, G(S*, y) admits a unique maximum. Now, using the ordered interchangeability property of multiple saddle-point equilibria [2, p. 241, it readily follows that (3.11) is indeed the unique saddle-point solution-of G under (3.9), and hence that there can be at most one F-maximizing solution of (3.7) under (3.9). Otherwise, there will be at least two different y*'s maximizing G(S*, y) for the same S*, which is impossible since the kernel is strictly concave under (3.9).
Thus, completing verification of our claim on the saddle point of G, we now proceed with the proof of the theorem. A crucial observation now is the equality max F ( y ) = max min G (6, y) that is, the unrestricted maximum value of our function F is equal to the lower value of the game with kernel G. Since the upper and lower values of the game are equal under (3.9), and the saddle point is unique and linear, it follows that F admits a unique U Remark 3.1: The condition of Theorem 3.1 is sufficient for the affine solution to be overall maximizing, but there is no indication that it is also necessary; in fact, it is quite plausible that the result is valid for all values of the parameters defining the problem. Nonsatisfaction of (3.9) simply means that the auxiliary game defined in the proof of the theorem does not admit a saddle point; that is, the upper value is strictly larger than the lower value; however, this does not outrule the possibility that the maximizing 0 Condition (3.9) was given in terms of the solution of (3.7). It is possible, however, to derive another condition, directly in terms of the parameters of the problem, which would guarantee satisfaction of (3.9). The following corollary (to Theorem 3.1) does precisely that.
Corollary 3.1: The pair of policies given in Proposition 3.1 is the unique globally optimal solution if p0p2P<4.
(3.12)
Proof: The result follows from Theorem 3.1 if we can show that (3.12) implies (3.9). Towards this end rewrite (3.9), in view of (3.7), as
maximizing policy which is linear in fo.
solution for F ( y ) is still affine. Remark 3.1: Condition (3.12) above is in fact a very reasonable condition which is satisfied in all practical cases. Note that since p2/3 < 1, it is satisifed whenever uo I 4oW, that is, the variance of the initial state xo should not be much larger than the variance of the noise wo.
0

IV. SOLUTION TO THE FINITE HORIZON PROBLEM
Guided by the results of the previous section, we now seek a solution to the general finite horizon problem formulated in Section 11, first in the class of policies u;=-fl(x;, I;)=pl(x;-E[x;~Z;]), i=o, I , . * . (4. la) where p i is a general linear mapping, say
Later we will show (in Proposition 4.2) that the optimum solution obtained in this class is in fact optimum in the larger class of policies where y ; above is allowed to be any affine mapping, and furthermore (in Section V) that under certain conditions it is optimal even in the class of general nonlinear policies. The first step in our derivation is to obtain a recursive algorithm for E[x, 1 I,] when y N is restricted to the class given above. Note that xi is generated by Hence, when the policies are restricted to the form (4.1), the stochastic control problem becomes equivalent to the deterministic optimal control problem under the dynamic (state equation) constraint (4.4) . We now show that this optimal control problem admits a unique solution, and we characterize the solution in terms of a recursive equation.
A . Preliminary Notation recursively by
For each positive scalar p , let { W k ( P ) > t = , be defined ii) The control problem (4.4), (4.5) admits a solution { L ; } F z O which is given by (4.8), and the corresponding optimum trajectory is generated by (4.7).
iii) The optimum solution satisfies O s L : l l , k < N , and L;= 1.
iv) The maximum value of (4.5) is WO( po)uW.
To set the stage for the proof of this result, we will state and prove a number of auxiliary lemmata. Lemm! 4.2: The value of the optimal control problem (4.4), (4.5) is J z = Wo(po)uw, where WO(.) is obtained through the recursive equation Proof: This follows from a standard dynamic programming 0 argument (see, e.g., [4] and [7] ). 
Proof:
The proof is by induction on k. Firstly, for k = N , hence, the bound is exact for k = N. Now, we show that if the bound is valid for k + 1, then it is also valid for k. Toward this end, consider the following sequence of inequalities:
where the first inequality is a property of the supremum, the second inequality follows from the stipulated bound on wk+ I , and the third strict inequality follows since p > 0 and { A k } is a positive sequence. Since the upper bound was valid for k = N, by induction it is valid for all k < N.
To prove the strict lower bound, it is sufficient to see that 
(L2p + I)] + r ) and note that if W k + , ( p ) is continuous in its argument, then G k ( p , L ) is jointly continuous in ( p , L ) , and consequently w k ( p ) = supL G k ( p , L ) is continuous in p , provided that Gk is bounded above in L . Since WN+ ( p ) is zero (and thereby continuous in p ) , it follows by induction (on k) that
Gk( p , L) is jointly continuous in ( p , L ) for dl k I N, under the
proviso that it is bounded above in L. However, using the bound Now, since ( L -L2/2)p t p for L E (0, l), and the second term of Gk was increasing i n p for all L , as shown above, it follows that Therefore, the result is true for k if it is true for k + 1 I N + 1, thus completing the induction. As a byproduct, we also obtain ii) . where Li is an arbitrary scalar and li is some arbitrary affine mapping. To save from notation let us denote the first term in (4.12) by Ci, and the second term by mi, which are both random variables. Now, substituting this form into (2. l), and recognizing that ai and mi are uncorrelated, we obtain the functional where in arriving at the last step we have used the fact that ( mi)2 is a nonnegative random variable (hence, the inequality), and have also utilized the interchange of conditional expectations as in (2.7). Now, the final step of the proof is to recognize that the sigma field generated by y i is the same as the sigma field generated by yi, where
(This is true since mk is yk-l-rneasurable.) Hence, where the RHS is precisely the function that was maximized earlier in this section under the structural restriction (4. la). Since and this upper bound is attained (as shown in Proposition 4.1), the proof is completed. U
V. OFTIMALITY OVER THE NONLINEAR CLASS, AND THE INFINITE HORIZON CASE
In this section we provide two extensions to the analysis and results of Section IV: i) a study of the optimality of linear policies in the general class of nonlinear policies; and ii) the infinitehorizon problem.
A. Optimality Over the Nonlinear Class
In Section IV we have shown that the stochastic dynamic optimization problem formulated in Section I1 admits an optimal solution in the class of affine policies (cf. Proposition 4.2), whereas in Section 111 we had shown that for the two-stage version of the problem the linear solution is optimal even in the larger class of nonlinear policies. The proof given in Section I11 was an indirect one, relating the solution of the original problem to the saddle-point solution of a stochastic zero-sum game. The question now is whether that line of proof carries over to the general Nstage problem so as to establish overall optimality of the policies (4.1 I).
It turns out that a nontrivial extension of the game-theoretic approach is possible, where we now define, instead of a single game, a sequence of nested zero-sum games, each one imposing saddle-point existence conditions on the problem similar to that of (3.9). We provide below the essentials of our line of approach, and the construction of the nested games which are used in the proof of overall optimality . The procedure also leads recursively to precise conditions under which the linear solution of Proposi- To prove this, we first observe that, with yN-' = yN-'* as given, the optimality of 6; follows readily from the Kalman filter theory; verification of the other side of the saddle-point inequality, however, is quite subtle, and is discussed next. Now, the problem is to maximize , over -yN-', which is another nonstandard stochastic control problem and is as difficult to solve as the original one. Towards its solution we first note that, since This new game is structurally similar to the N -Ith one, and hence following the earlier procedure we can obtain only part of the saddle point, comprising the policies 6;-I and y;-2, with the derivation of y;-3 left to the next game in the sequence. Hence, this way, we define, recursively, a sequence of nested games admits a saddle point on& in the structural form (4.11).
Finally, consistency of the adopted procedure requires that ii) the linear control law (4.11) is optimal also in the class of nonlinear policies.
Proof: The proof follows from the construction of nested games prior to the statement of the theorem, and the two facts that: i) the only saddle-point solution of the game with kernel GN-is linear with the structure (4.11); and ii) the solution to the original stochastic control problem exists in the class of linear policies (cf. Proposition 4.2). U Remark 5.1: It can be seen through some routine manipulations that when N = 1 and n = 0, the condition (5.3), and hence that of Theorem 5.1, is equivalent to that of Theorem 3.1.
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B. The Infinite Horizon Case
We treat the infinite horizon case as the limit of the finite horizon problem as N ---* 03, provided that the discounted payoff (2.1) remains bounded and the optimum policy sequence (4.11) converges to a well-defined limit. Note that since the optimal policy (cf. Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 4.2) is linear, the stationary limiting policy will be given by where L * is the stationary solution of the optimal control problem To study the existence of such a limit, we first recall that the value function wk(p) defined in (4.6) is strictly increasing for 
0
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the main messages of this paper has been that there do exist stochastic control problems of the nonneutral type which admit analytic solutions. However, even for the seemingly simple scalar problem of this paper, the derivation of optimal policies and proof of their existence is quite a nontrivial task, requiring an indirect approach. It would be interesting (and quite rewarding) to explore the possibility of devising a more direct approach towards the solution of this problem; although, by the experience of the author, this seems to be quite unlikely. We should also note that even though the solution has been obtained in closed form, it still involves (off-line) the solution of a nonlinear deterministic optimal control problem which, even numerically, is not easy.
The general approach of this paper, which relates the original single-person optimization problem to a sequence of nested zerosum games, is original and seems to appear in the literature for the first time. One of its unique aspects is the demonstration of the utility of the powerful machinery of saddle-point equilibria even in problems which are neither formulated as, nor can directly be converted to, zero-sum games. Other applications of this approach could be seen, for example, in extending the results of this paper to more general models where (2.2) is replaced by higher order ARMA processes. Such an extension, although not immediate, seems to be possible.
APPENDIX
Here, we provide interpretations for the different terms used in the mathematical model of Section 11, in the context of the rational expectations model alluded to in Section I. Further insight into the model can be gained from [3] and [SI.
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are actually two players in this decision problem, the policy maker (say, the government) and the private (or the public) sector. The former is an active decision maker, who controls the rate of monetary growth, which we denote by U; at time step i. This is, in fact, the desired (planned) rate, which will in general be different from the actual rate of monetary growth y; because of independent shocks impending on the economy. Now, the other player is a passive one, who simply attempts to predict the future (one-step ahead) value of y;, using the information available at time i , which we denote by 1;; hence, his input to the decision problem is E [yjlZj] .
The difference between the actual and predicted values of y;, yi -E[y;IZ;] is called the monetary surprise which, according to common belief, has a positive impact on the economy, because it leads to stimulation. The benefit that accrues from stimulation will have to be traded off against the negative (inflationary) effect caused by large values of U;. This tradeoff is captured in the preference parameter x,, which is only known to the policy maker. Then, the problem is to find the best mix between stimulation and inflation, which is formulated as a dynamic optimization problem. The objective function adopted, J N , reflects the tradeoff between benefit derived from stimulation 
